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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee, Case No. 940425-CA
ROBERT HAROLD BOAZ, Priority No. 2
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
•TITUSDICTION ANT) NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This Court has original appellate jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994). Defendant was convicted of violatmg statutory provisions
regulating the sale of stocks and sales by unregistered agents. This appeal challenges the trial
court's order, committing defendant to the Utah State Prison for three consecutive
indeterminate terms of 0- to 3- years.
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial court act within its lawful discretion when it imposed, and stayed, three
consecutive 0- to 3- year prison sentences after the defendant's conviction of felony offenses
involving the offer or sale of securities?
This Court will not overturn a sentence unless the trial court has abused its discretion,
failed to consider legally relevant factors, or imposed a term that exceeds prescribed
limits. State v. Nuttall. 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah App. 1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
All relevant provisions are attached to this brief in the addenda.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedural history
The State originally charged defendant with 14 counts regarding the unlawful offer or
sale of securities (R. 7-13). Two counts were later dismissed and an amended information was
filed (R. 559). On February 11, 1994, defendant entered into a plea bargain, in which he pled
guilty to three felony counts and the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges (R. 463-
70). Defendant specifically pled guilty to counts 4, 5, and 9, which alleged that he had
violated Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1989), Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3 (Supp. 1994). and Utah
Code Ann. § 61-1-7 (1989) (R. 9,10,11). The defendant made his plea conditional on his
right to appeal the district court's jurisdiction (R. 461). On March 21, 1994, the trial court
imposed three consecutive 0- to 3-year prison terms but stayed execution and placed defendant
on probation (R. 475).
Statement offacts
Defendant's conviction resulted from his sale of securities in the "Mexican Peso'U.S.
Dollar Exchange Program" (R. 464). Although unregistered to sell securities in Utah,
Defendant offered to sell securities in this program to two individuals fid."). He was convicted
for this conduct as well as for omitting material facts regarding the securities which were
necessary in order not to mislead the potential buyers fid.).
Defendant did not give the potential buyers a prospectus, as required by Utah law, or
provide any of the information required in a prospectus, i.e., financial statements, a discussion
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about the foreign exchange market for Mexican pesos, the amount of securities being offered,
details as to the application of proceeds from the sale, commissions paid or payable,
biographical details of principals and promoters, and sources of other funds for the business
(R. 19). The two individuals that defendant was convicted for defrauding invested a total of
$7000 in the scheme (R. 20).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Though it be true that Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (1989) (amended 1992)1 prohibits a
court from sentencing a person to prison in certain circumstances, those circumstances are not
present here. The State did not charge defendant with violating a rule or order; the
information clearly charged him with violating the statutory law. Section 61-1-21 does not
make ignorance of statutory law a defense. The maxim that people are presumed to know the
law still holds but the consequence of ignorantly violating an administrative rule or order is
softened. This softening provision is irrelevant, however, to the defendant, because the State
never accused him of violating mere administrative rules or orders, but of violating criminal
statutes.
In any event, the proper interpretation of the language at issue in section 61-1-21
requires the defendant to establish that he did not know of the rule or order. Yet. defendant
provided no evidence that he lacked knowledge of anything. Throughout the sentencing
hearing counsel for defendant merely asserts that the defendant lacked scienter. These
assertions were never supported. Thus, even assuming that "non-imprisonment" language in
1 Section 61-1-21 was amended in 1992, but the affect does not affect this case.
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section 61-1-21 related to this case, defendant failed to meet his burden of proving that he did
not know about the rules or orders allegedly violated.
In the defendant's self-written supplemental brief, he argues that the district court, and
by implication this Court, lack both subject matter and personal jurisdiction to try him for a
crime. Defendant's challenges to the court's jurisdiction make little sense given the actual
nature of this case. Even assuming that he is not a citizen of the United States but is only a
citizen of the Texas "State/Republic" that assumption does not relieve defendant of his liability
for criminal actions he commits in Utah. The "United States" is not prosecuting the
defendant; the "State/Republic" of Utah is prosecuting defendant for actions he committed
within the territory of the state.
ARGUMENT
I. BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS NOT
CONVICTED FOR VIOLATING A RULE OR
ORDER, SECTION 61-1-21 DOES NOT LIMIT
THE COURT'S ABILITY TO SENTENCE
HIM TO PRISON.
From the time he was First charged with committing a criminal offense, defendant knew
that the State was alleging that he had violated the criminal law, not a rule or order. The
information gave the defendant specific and precise information about his conduct and the
manner in which that conduct violated state law (R. 7-14). The State charged defendant with
selling securities that were unregistered in Utah, omitting material facts in his representations
to potential buyers, and for being unregistered to act as a broker or seller in Utah (id.).
When a court convicts a person for violating any of these provisions, the penalty is set
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (1989) (amended 1992). When defendant committed his
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crimes, this statute provided for a fine of no more than $10,000, imprisonment for no more
than three years, or both. Section 63-1-21 also contained the following language: "No person
may be imprisoned for the violation of any rule or order if he proves that he had no knowledge
of the rule or order." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (1989) (amended 1992).
However, defendant was not convicted for violating a rule or order. Thus, the language
in section 61-1-21 that bars imprisonment in some cases does not limit the trial court's broad
discretion to impose a prison sentence in this case. That language only prohibits a prison
sentence when (1) the person was convicted for violating a rule or order; and (2) the person
proves he had no knowledge of the rule or order. In State v. Stephan. 671 P.2d 780 (Wash.
App. 1983), the defendant also challenged the court's power to impose a prison sentence on
the grounds that he did not know the rules or orders. Like defendant in this case, Stephan
was convicted for violating several provisions of Washington's laws regarding securities
registration and sales practices. Stephan. 671 P.2d at 782. The Washington court concluded
that the term "rule or order" did not refer to legislatively-enacted statutes, but only to the
securities division's administrative rules and orders. \& at 782-83. As the court pointed out,
this non-imprisonment language originated in the federal Securities and Exchange Act as a
limitation on the Securities and Exchange Commission's rule-making authority. EL; s_££
United States v. Lillev. 291 F.Supp. 989, 992 (D.C. Tex. 1968)(congressional debates showed
that provision written to prevent commission from "[adopting] or amending rules and
regulations without notice, thereby subjecting innocent persons to a harsh criminal penalty.").
As in Stephan. defendant here was not charged with violating a rule or order, but with
violating state statutes. Stephan. 671 P.2d at 783. Therefore, defendant's knowledge of
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division rules or orders is irrelevant to the essential question that faced the trial court, i.e.,
having admitted to violating a state law, should defendant be sentenced to the statutorily
prescribed term of imprisonment? Section 61-1-21 does not excuse defendant from knowing,
and obeying, the laws. Lillev. 291 F.Supp. at 992 (Congress intended to charge even' man
with knowledge of the standards prescribed in the securities acts themselves).
Defendant's argument then that section 61-1-21 prevented the trial court from imposing a
prison sentence is wrong. The only limitation on the trial court's discretion is the general one
of fairness and justice. That obligation prevents a court from imposing a sentence that is
inherently unfair, clearly excessive, or one that no reasonable person could adopt. State v.
Nuttall. 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Russell 1 791 P.2d 188. 192-93 (Utah
1990); State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978).
The trial court knew that defendant's case had both mitigating and aggravating factors
(R. 606-7). The court carried out its inherent duty of fairness and justice in the best way
possible: by imposing the maximum prison sentence while staying execution of the sentence in
order to allow the defendant to make restitution while on probation and to complete his appeal
of right (R. 609). The trial court's terms of probation included six months in jail, community
service, and recoupment of jail time (R. 610). The defendant has not served his jail time
because the court also stayed execution of that sentence pending this appeal.
In rendering his decision, the trial judge looked at the harm caused to the victims, their
vulnerability, and the defendant's willingness to take advantage of those vulnerabilities over a
period of time (id.). Even after looking at those factors though, the sentence is remarkably
light. Indeed, the only lighter sentencing option that the court could have imposed would have
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been for a fine of $10,000 per offense. When looked at in this light, defendant's challenge
becomes little more than an unsupported claim that the Court has no right to sentence anyone
to prison for these offenses. Because the court stayed execution and placed the defendant on
probation, any prison term defendant may serve will actually result from his refusal to comply
with the terms of probation, namely, paying restitution to the victims: "If Mr. Boaz is not
going to honor the conditions of his probation, then as far as I am concerned the only fair
thing is for him to serve the maximum time in prison." (R. 609). The "stick" of potential
incarceration thus serves a useful and beneficial purpose to the ultimate goal of compensating
the victims.
In the alternative, even if a rule or order were an element in the defendant's conviction,
he never met his burden to prove that he "had no knowledge of the rule or order." Utah Code
Ann. § 61-1-21 (1989) (amended 1992). Section 61-1-21 only prohibits imprisonment for the
violation of any rule or order "if he [the defendant] proves that he had no knowledge of the
rule or order." Id. (emphasis added). By its very terms, this statute places on the defendant
the responsibility to prove his lack of knowledge. Lillev. 291 F.Supp. At 993 (even if "no
knowledge" clause applicable to defendant, he still did not prove that he had no knowledge).
Other than his unsupported legal arguments at the sentencing hearing that try to explain why
"willful" does not mean "willful," defendant also did not meet his burden at trial nor does he
meet it here.
II. THE TRIAL COURT HAD PERSONAL AND
SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION OVER
THE DEFENDANT; THEREFORE, THE COURT
CORRECTLY DENIED HIS MOTION TO
DISMISS.
FiBdiy. defend™., pro se jurisdict.ona,«, are unsupported The ^ ^
correct* record that lt had constitution, aulhorlty (0 ^^ alleged ^ ^
°f Stat£ 1SW (" "2"^ Def— « - - , no, . cit.en of ., Um(ed ^
-ther reheves hrm 0f respond,,, for hls actlons nor d£pnves ^ $me from makmg hm
Code Ann. S76-1-201(1) (]995) makes a]] ^ ^ ^^ ^^^
committed within the state (R. 473).
I- «diffia* «o see how defendant's status as . Cltl2en of the "Untted States of
Amm" rath£r ^ ^ "United S^" <**> »™-. The federal gove„ IS not
prosecute defendant. Th.s conviction arose solely from conduct commuted mUtah te
viCattons of Utah iaw that ultilnately harmed U|ah residents ^^ ^^^
defendant p^ to state that Utah couns are w.thout Jurlsdlctl0n because he , ,^ q{
the "State/Republic" of Texas (Supp,emen,al Brief of Defendant at 3).
Therefore, he cUuns. only the United States Supreme Conn has junsdtction over ^
— W. This ardent rehes on, bu, mmmerprets, antc.e 3, sect.on 2, Cause 1of ^
Untted States Constitution, whtch gives the federai supreme conn, and other conns that
Confess may create, jurisdiction t0 hear^^^ ^ ^^ ^
"•S. Cons,, an. m, §2, cl. ,. Thls^^^ ^^ ^ ^ ^ ^
^eren, su.es, hut ts so.eiy between thrs State and one of fc restdents. Defendant has
aione give Ulan, courts„, and subject _ ^^^^^ ^ ^ ^
cri™s. Nitimj^$<Ml£L, 66 P.2d 365 (Utah 1937).
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CONCLUSION
For these reasons, defendant's convictions should be affirmed.
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED
Because the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs, oral
argument would not significantly aid the Court in deciding this case.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS JllJday of March 1995.
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General
'//
hP^-HaJ^
JAMES H. BEADLES
Assistant Attorney General
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Salt Lake Legal Defenders Assoc.
434 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
1/>^/(/um^
10
ADDENDA
ADDENDUM A
291 F.Supp, 989
(Ciieas:291 F.Supp. 989)
UNITED STATES of America
v.
Lester L. LILLEV.
UNITED STATES of America
v.
Malcolm G. BAKER, Jr.
Crim. Nos. 67-H-233, 68-H-228.
United States District Court S.D. Texas, Houston
Division.
Oct. 2, 1968.
Defendants charged with violations of Securities
and Exchange Commission rule prohibiting use of
manipulative devices in sale of stock moved to have
imprisonment excluded from sentence which court
might impose. The District Court, Noel. J., held
that each defendant's admission that he knew his
conduct was manipulative and that he knew
securities fraud was illegal precluded him from
discharging his burden of showing that he had no
knowledge of violated rule, within statute
prohibiting imprisonment for violation of any rule if
violator proves he had no knowledge thereof.
Motions denied.
[1] CRJMTNAL LAW @^ 273.3
110k273.3
By pleading guilty to indictment and information,
defendants admitted each and all acts charged.
[2] STATUTES <^=> 181(1)
361kl81(l)
First and most essential step in construction of any
statute is to ascertain intent of Congress in passing
it.
[31 LICENSES <S^= 42(7)
238k42(7)
Under section of Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
prohibiting imprisonment for violation of any rule
of Securities and Exchange Commission if violator
proves he had no knowledge of rule, a person cannot
properly be imprisoned for violation of standard in
rule of which he had no knowledge. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 32(a), 15 U.S.C.A. §
78ff(a).
[3] SECURITIES REGULATION <$=> 194
Page 1
349BU94
Under section of Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
prohibiting imprisonment for violation of any rule
of Securities and Exchange Commission if violator
proves he had no knowledge of rule, a person cannot
properly be imprisoned for violation of standard in
rule of which he had no knowledge. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 32(a), 15 U.S.C.A. §
78ff(a).
[4] LICENSES «=> 42(7)
238k42(7)
Every man is charged with knowledge of standards
prescribed in Securities Acts themselves and person
whose conduct is expressly prohibited thereby is not
entitled to prove no knowledge of parallel rule
pursuant to statute prohibiting imprisonment for
violation of rule of Commission if violator proves
he had no knowledge thereof. Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, § 32(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ffia).
[4] SECURITIES REGULATION &=> 194
349BU94
Every man is charged with knowledge of standards
prescribed in Securities Acts themselves and person
whose conduct is expressly prohibited thereby is not
entitled to prove no knowledge of parallel rule
pursuant to statute prohibiting imprisonment for
violation of rule of Commission if violator proves
he had no knowledge thereof. Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, § 32(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff(a).
[5] LICENSES <£= 42(7)
238k42(7)
Inasmuch as Securities Act prohibits securities fraud
in language almost identical with Commission's rule
prohibiting employment of manipulative and
deceptive devices in sale of stock and defendants
pleaded guilty to price manipulation, which is
expressly prohibited by Securities Exchange Act of
1934, even though they contended that they did not
happen to know that their conduct was in violation
of rule, defendants were not entitled to avoid
imprisonment under statute prohibiting
imprisonment for violation of any rule if violator
proves he had no knowledge thereof. Securities Act
of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77q(a); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 9(a) (2), 32(a), 15
U.S.C.A. §§78i(a)(2), 78ff(a).
[51 SECURITIES REGULATION <S= 194
349BU94
Copr. c West 1995 No claim to orig. U.S. govt, works
291 F.Supp. 989
(Cite as: 291 F.Supp. 989)
Inasmuch as Securities Act prohibits securities fraud
in language almost identical with Commission's rule
prohibiting employment of manipulative and
deceptive devices in sale of stock and defendants
pleaded guilty to price manipulation, which is
expressly prohibited by Securities Exchange Act of
1934, even though they contended that they did not
happen to know that their conduct was in violation
of rule, defendants were not entitled to avoid
imprisonment under statute prohibiting
imprisonment for violation of any rule if violator
proves he had no knowledge thereof. Securities Act
of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77q(a); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 9(a) (2), 32(a), 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 78i(a) (2), 78ff(a).
[6] LICENSES c§=> 42(7)
238k42{7)
Within statute prohibiting imprisonment for
violation of rule of Securities and Exchange
Commission if violator had no knowledge thereof,
"no knowledge" means ignorance that conduct was
contrary to law. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §
32(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff(a).
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial
constructions and definitions.
[6] SECURITIES REGULATION <S=> 194
349Bkl94
Within statute prohibiting imprisonment for
violation of rule of Securities and Exchange
Commission if violator had no knowledge thereof,
"no knowledge" means ignorance that conduct was
contrary to law. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §
32(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff(a).
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial
constructions and definitions.
[7] LICENSES <S=» 42(4)
238k42(4)
Admission of each violator of rule of Securities and
Exchange Commission prohibiting employment of
manipulative devices in sale of stock that he knew
his conduct was manipulative and that he knew
securities fraud was illegal precluded each from
discharging his burden of showing that he had no
knowledge of rule within statute prohibiting
imprisonment for violation of rule if violator proves
he had no knowledge thereof. Securities Act of
1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77q(a); Securities
Page 2
Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 9(a) (2). 32(a), 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 78i(a)(2), 78if(a).
[7] SECURITIES REGULATION <S=> 199
349Bkl99
Admission of each violator of rule of Securities and
Exchange Commission prohibiting employment of
manipulative devices in sale of stock that he knew
his conduct was manipulative and that he knew
securities fraud was illegal precluded each from
discharging his burden of showing that he had no
knowledge of rule within statute prohibiting
imprisonment for violation of rule if violator proves
he had no knowledge thereof. Securities Act of
1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77q(a); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 9(a) (2), 32(a). 15
U.S.C.A. §§78i(a)(2), 78ff(a).
[8] CRIMINAL LAW <S=> 273.3
110k273.3
By pleading guilty to charges of engaging in
manipulative devices in sale of stock, defendants
admitted that they knew securities fraud was
prohibited and no more knowledge was required for
conviction for violation of rule of Securities and
Exchange Commission prohibiting use of such
devices and no more knowledge was required for
purposes of statute prohibiting imprisonment for
violation of any rule if violator proves he had no
knowledge of rule. Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 32(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff(a).
[8] LICENSES <&=> 42(7)
238k42(7)
By pleading guilty to charges of engaging in
manipulative devices in sale of stock, defendants
admitted that they knew securities fraud was
prohibited and no more knowledge was required for
conviction for violation of rule of Securities and
Exchange Commission prohibiting use of such
devices and no more knowledge was required for
purposes of statute prohibiting imprisonment for
violation of any rule if violator proves he had no
knowledge of rule. Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 32(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff(a).
[8] SECURITIES REGULATION <&=> 194
349Bkl94
By pleading guilty lo charges of engaging in
manipulative devices in sale of stock, defendants
admitted that they knew securities fraud was
prohibited and no more knowledge was required for
Copr. c West 1995 No claim to orig. U.S. govt, works
291 F.Supp. 989
(Cite as: 291 F.Supp. 989)
conviction for violation of rule of Securities and
Exchange Commission prohibiting use of such
devices and no more knowledge was required for
purposes of statute prohibiting imprisonment for
violation of any rule if violator proves he had no
knowledge of rule. Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 32(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff(a).
•990 U.S. Atty., Morton Susman, and Asst. U.S.
Atty., Malcolm Dimmitt, for the United States.
Wayne Fisher, of Fisher, Roch, Sales &
Blackstock, Houston, Tex., for Lester L. Lillev.
Walter P. Zivley of Liddell, Dawson, Sapp &
Zivley, Houston, Tex., for Malcolm G. Baker, Jr.
MEMORANDUM OPINION:
NOEL, District Judge.
These are related cases arising out of the collapse
of Westec Corporation in August 1966. Both
defendants are charged with violations of SEC Rule
10b-5, which provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails, or of any facility of a national securities
exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to
defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact
or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading or
(3) to engage in any act, practice or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security. 17 C.F.R.
240.10b-5, prescribed by the Securities and
Exchange Commission pursuant to 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b).
On December 9, 1967, defendant Lester L. Lilley
pled guilty to a one-count indictment charging that
he 'directly and indirectly, wilfully and knowingly,
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did employ a manipulative and deceptive device and
contrivance * * * in that (he) did employ a device,
scheme, and artifice to defraud, did make untrue
statements of material facts * * * and did engage in
acts, practices and a course of business which did
operate as *991 a fraud and deceit upon various
persons, including brokers, dealers, and
stockholders of Westec Corporation, all in the
following manner:
"That from on or about May 1, 1966, until on or
about August 25, 1966. (he) and others acting in
concert with him purchased approximately 470,000
shares of the common capital stock of Westec
Corporation from various brokerage companies in
the State of Texas and elsewhere at prices ranging
from $45.00 to $60.00 per share, while at
substantially the same time, the defendant * * * and
others acting in concert with him, sold and arranged
for the sale of a substantial number of said shares of
said Westec Corporation common capital stock.'
It was further alleged in the indictment to which
Lillev pled guilty, that the 'series of transactions in
Westec Corporation common capital stock described
hereinabove would and did create a false and
misleading appearance of actual and apparent active
trading in such stock and did raise its price and did
cause and induce other persons to purchase such
stock, all of which was then and there well known to
the defendant, Lester L. Lilley. and such acts were
committed and caused to be committed by him for
such purposes.'
On August 27, 1968, defendant Malcolm G.
Baker, Jr., pled guilty to a onecount criminal
information likewise charging violation of SEC Rule
10b-5 in that 'on or about May 11. 1966 (Baker)
and others acting in concert with him purchased
approximately 13,000 shares of the common capital
stock of Westec Corporation * * * which said
purchases were intended to, and did, artificially
maintain the price of Westec stock and did support
the market price of said stock and prevent it from
declining and would and did create a false and
misleading appearance of actual and apparent active
trading in such stock * * * and said acts were
committed and caused to be committed by him for
such purposes.'
[1] By pleading guilty to the indictment and
information, defendants admitted each and all of the
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acts charged in them, respectively. Subject to their
motions to which this memorandum opinion is
addressed, defendants are now before the Court for
sentencing.
The penalty provision of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 is 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a), which provides:
Any person who willfully violates any provision
of this chapter, or any rule or regulation thereunder
the violation of which is made unlawful or the
observance of which is required under the terms of
this chapter, * * * shall upon conviction be fined not
more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than
two years, or both, * * *; but no person shall[FNl]
be subject to imprisonment under this section for the
violation of any rule or regulation if he proves that
he had no knowledge of such rule or regulation.
Pursuant to the 'no knowledge' clause or
exception of 78ff(a), each defendant has moved to
have imprisonment excluded from the sentence
which this Court may impose. An evidentiary
hearing has been held, at which each defendant took
the witness stand. The only evidence of probative
force consisted of the testimony of defendants. Each
defendant testified that he had no knowledge of Rule
10b-5 at the time he committed the admitted acts.
In ruling on these motions the Court first must
construe the penalty statute to determine the
meaning and purpose of the 'no knowledge' clause
or exception and its applicability, if any, to the
charges and facts. If the clause is found applicable,
it must then be determined as to each defendant
whether he has discharged his burden of proof.
The clause or exception is unusual in that it
permits a defendant to rebut the presumption that he
had knowledge of the rule or regulation under which
he is charged. The provision has never been
construed, although it has been held constitutional
*992 in the face of vagueness attack.[FN1]
[2j The first step, indeed the most essential step,
in the construction of any statute is to ascertain the
intent of the Congress in passing it. Unfortunately,
in the case of this 'no knowledge' clause, the
evidence of such intent is somewhat obscure. The
clause was added in the conference committee
formed to compromise the differences in the bills
passed by the Senate and the House of
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Representatives, which ultimaiely became the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The report of the
conference committee announced but did not explain
the compromise[FN2] between the House and Senate
versions of Section 32 of the Act. From the
research conducted by counsel, and its own
independent research, the Court is persuaded that no
minutes or other records of the conference
committee's deliberations exist. But earlier debates
in both House and Senate cast some light on the
purpose of the clause, for they reveal the fears
generated by the spectre of a severe penalty ensuing
from violation of a rule or regulation of the
proposed new administrative body, of which the
person charged had no knowledge.
The bill approved by the House had a more
stringent punishment provision than the compromise
contained in 78ff(a). It did not distinguish
violations of rules from violations of the Act. For
either kind of violation an offender might be fined
or imprisoned or both.[FN3] Representative
Cooper, a member of the House Committe on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce which had
considered the bill, offered an amendment that
would have limited criminal punishment to
violations of the Act itself. The amendment was
defeated. The House rejected Representative
Cooper's argument that an administrative board
should not be granted the 'unlimited power to draft
rules and regulations the violation of which is a
criminal offense.'[FN4]
The Senate version, by contrast, distinguished
violations of a rule from a violation of the Act. The
maximum penalty for the former was to be only a
$10,000 fme, while the maximum penalty for the
latter was to be a $25,000 fine and/or five years
imprisonment. Senator Steiwer considered even a
maximum of $10,000 too severe a penalty for a rule
violation, and offered an amendment that would
have limited the fine to $500 unless the prosecution
proved an intent to defraud. His remarks suggest a
fear that the Commission might adopt or amend
rules and regulations without notice, thereby
subjecting innocent persons to a harsh criminal
penalty.[FN5] The Senate rejected this amendment
because violations of rules had already been
sufficiently distinguished from violations of the
Act.[FN6]
[3][4][5] It seems clear, therefore, that the
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compromise was adopted to ensure that no person
could be imprisoned for the violation of a standard
contained in a rule of which he had no knowledge.
It is equally clear, however, that Congress intended
to charge every man with knowledge of the
standards prescribed in the securities acts
themselves. It would frustrate the intent of
Congress to permit a person whose conduct is
expressly prohibited by statute to attempt to prove
no knowledge of a parallel rule provision. Allowing
these defendants to invoke the 'no knowledge'
clause would have precisely this effect. The conduct
here admitted by defendants is prohibited by two
provisions of the securities acts. Section 17(a) of
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77q(a).
prohibits securities fraud in language almost
identical *993 with the language of Rule 10b-5.
[FN7] Moreover, the fraudulent activity to which
defendants have pled guilty, price manipulation, is
expressly prohibited by 9(a)(2) of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. 78i(a)(2). [FN81 It was not intended by the
Congress thai the 'no knowledge' clause of the
penalty statute (78ff(a)) should be available to
persons who were charged with knowing their
conduct to be in violation of law, but did not happen
to know that it was in violation of a particular rule
or regulation of the SEC such as Rule 10b-5.
[6] Alternatively, if the 'no knowledge' clause is
applicable under the facts of their situation. I find
that defendants have failed to satisfy their burden of
showing no knowledge of Rule 10b-5. Proof of no
knowledge cannot mean proof that defendants did
not know, for example, the precise number or
common name of the rule, the book and page where
it was to be found, or the date upon which it was
promulgated. It does not even mean proof of a lack
of knowledge that their conduct was proscribed by
rule rather than by statute. Proof of 'no knowledge'
of the rule can only mean proof of an ignorance of
the substance of the rule, proof that they did not
know that their conduct was contrary to law.
Here, neither defendant has discharged his
burden, whether the standard for measuring same be
that of 'beyond a reasonable doubt' or, 'by a
preponderance of the evidence.' The rule does not
attempt to itemize specific kinds of fraud,
Therefore, proof that a defendant knew securities
fraud to be prohibited by law should prevent him
from discharging his burden under the 'no
knowledge' clause of proving ignorance of Rule
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10b-5.
[7] In pleading guilty to the charges heretofore
quoted, each of these defendants admitted that he
knew securities fraud was a violation of law. Each
also testified that he did not consider his
manipulative conduct as fraudulent, but Rule 10b-5
does not expressly prohibit the fraudulent
manipulation of securities prices. It prohibits fraud,
and leaves to the courts the task of defining the
specific kinds of securities fraud. A lack of
knowledge that manipulative activity is fraudulent is
thus irrelevant. What is relevant is that each
defendant has admitted that he knew his conduct was
manipulative and that he knew securities fraud was
illegal. These admissions by each defendant
preclude him from discharging his burden of
showing 'no knowledge' of Rule 10b-5. To the
contrary, they affirmatively demonstrate that
defendants were familiar with the import of the rule.
The 'no knowledge' requirement of 78ff(a) is not
met by proof that defendants did not know that their
specific conduct was within the prohibition of the
rule.
•994 [81 By pleadmg guilty to the charges
heretofore quoted, defendants admitted that they
knew securities fraud was prohibited, which is the
substance of Rule 10b-5. No more knowledge is
required.
For the foregoing reasons, which to the extent
they may be in conflict therewith, supersede those
given orally from the bench, I find that neither
defendant is entitled to the benefit of the limitation
of punishment clause of 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).
Accordingly, each of the motions before the Court is
denied.
FN1. United States v. Guterma, 189 F.Supp. 265
(S. D.N. Y. 1960).
FN2. Report of the Joint Conference Committee, 78
Cong.Rec. 10263 (1934).
FN3. Ibid.
FN4. 78 Cong.Rec. 8112, 8113 (1934;.
FN5. 78 Cong.Rec. 8273-8298 (1934).
FN6. 78 Cong.Rec. 8281-8298 (1934).
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FN7. (a) It shall he unlawful for any person in the
offer or sale of any securities by the use of any
means or iiurumems of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or by the use
of the mails, directly or indirectly—(1) to employ
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or (2) to
obtain money or property by means of any untrue
statement of a material fact or any omission to slate
a material fact necessary to order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or (3)
to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon the purchaser.
FN8. (a) Ii shall he unlawful for any person.
directly or indirectly, by the use of the mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
or for any member of a national securities
exchange-(2) To effect, alone or with one or more
other persons, a series of transactions in any
security registered on a national securities exchange
creating actual or apparent active trading in such
security or raising or depressing the price of such
security, for the purpose of inducing the purchase
or sale of such security by others,
END OF DOCUMENT
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Phillip Michael STEPHAN, Appellant.
In the Matter of the Application for Relief From
Personal Restraint of:
Phillip Michael STEPHAN, Petitioner.
Nos. 5299-m-l, 5719-III-4.
Court of Appeals of Washington,
Division 3.
Oct. 18, 1983.
Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court,
Spokane County, Olson, J., of fraud in connection
with the offer and sale of a security. Defendant
appealed and filed personal restraint petition. The
Court of Appeals. Munson, C.J., held tha!: (1) trial
court properly sentenced defendant to a term of
imprisonment; (2) defendant was aware, prior to
pleading guilty, that the possible consequences of
his crime could include incarceration; (3) defendant
was not denied effective assistance of trial counsel;
and (4) trial court properly ordered restitution.
Conviction affirmed; personal restraint petition
demed.
[1] SECURITIES REGULATION ®= 323
349Bk323
Provision of Securities Act that "no person may be
imprisoned for the violation of any rule or order if
that person proves that he or she had no knowledge
of the rule or order" did not preclude the trial court
from sentencing a defendant, convicted of fraud in
connection with the offer and sale of a security, to a
term of imprisonment, as defendant violated a
statutory "provision," not a "rule or order." West's
RCWA 21,20.010, 21.20.400.
[2] CRIMINAL LAW <£=> 273.1(5)
110k273.1(5)
When a defendant fills out a written statement on
plea of guilty in compliance with rule and
acknowledges that he or she has read it and
understands it and that its contents are true, the
written statement provides prima facie verification
of the voluntariness of the plea. CrR 4.2(g).
[3] CRIMINAL LAW <£=> 273.1(5)
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110k273.1(5)
When a defendant's written statement on a plea of
guilty in compliance with rule provides prima facie
verification of the voluntariness of the plea and the
judge goes on to inquire orally of the defendant and
satisfies himself on the record of the existence of the
various criteria of voluntariness, the presumption of
voluntariness is well nigh irrefutable. CrR 4.2(g).
[4] CRIMINAL LAW <g=» 273.1(1)
110k273.1(l)
Whether a plea is entered knowingly is decided by
looking at all the circumstances.
[5] CRIMINAL LAW <&=> 273.1(4)
110k273.1(4)
Defendant entered guilty plea to violation of
provision of Securities Act with full knowledge that
incarceration was possible, notwithstanding his
attorney's misinterpretation of the applicable statute,
where defendant made a written statement on plea of
guilty in compliance with rule and the trial court
orally affirmed defendant's plea, and the record
contained at least six references to incarceration.
West's RCWA 21.20.010, 21.20.400; CrR 4.2(g).
[6] CRIMINAL LAW <$=> 1134(2)
HOkl 134(2)
Review of claim of defendant, convicted of violation
of provisions of the Securities Act, that he was
denied effective assistance of counsel, was upon the
entire record, and the issue was whether defendant
received effective representation and a fair and
impartial hearing. West's RCWA 21.20.010,
21,20.400.
[7] CRIMINAL LAW' <£= 641.13(2.1)
110k641.13(2.1)
Formerly 110k641.13(2)
Defendant, convicted pursuant to guilty plea of
violating provision of the Securities Act, was not
denied effective assistance of counsel on ground that
his trial counsel misled him on issue whether
defendant could be incarcerated for the offense with
which he was charged, in that, although trial counsel
argued an erroneous reading of the applicable
statute, defendant was made aware that the possible
consequences of his crime could include
incarceration. West's RCWA 21.20.010,
21.20.400.
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[8] CRTMLNAL LAW <^ 273.4(1)
110k273.4(l)
When the trial court indicates clearly the penalty for
a crime, any claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel related to the penalty is waived.
[9] CRIMINAL LAW <£=• 1030(1)
110kl030(l)
Failure to raise an issue before the trial court
generally precludes the party from raising it on
appeal.
[10] STATUTES •£= 181(1)
361kl81(l)
The rules of statutory construction require that the
Court of Appeals ascertain legislative intent, seek
the spirit of statutory provisions, and avoid a
construction which voids any section or words.
[10] STATUTES <S=> 183
361kl83
The rules of statutory construction require that the
Court of Appeals ascertain legislative intent, seek
the spirit of statutory provisions, and avoid a
construction which voids any section or words.
[10] STATUTES <£=• 206
361k206
The rules of statutory construction require that the
Court of Appeals ascertain legislative intent, seek
the spirit of statutory provisions, and avoid a
construction which voids any section or words.
[11] CRIMINAL LAW «=> 27
110k27
Language, "in any prosecution under this title," in
statute governing prosecutions related to felonies
defined outside the criminal code, refers to statutes
which, inter alia, define terms, limit actions,
establish culpability and capacity, set the standard of
proof, and establish defenses. West's RCWA
9A.04.010 et seq., 9A.16.010 et seq., 9A.20.020,
9A.20.030, 9A.20.040.
[12] CRIMINAL LAW ®=* 27
110k27
A felony defined outside the criminal code becomes
a classified crime through application of statutes
governing prosecutions related to felonies defined
outside the criminal code and punishment for felony
convictions. West's RCWA 9A.20.020,
9A.20.040.
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[13] CRIMINAL LAW <®=^ 1208.4(2)
110kl208.4(2)
A trial court may order restitution unless prohibited
by statute. West's RCWA 9A.20.030.
[14] SECURITIES REGULATION <S^ 329
349Bk329
In prosecution in which defendant pleaded guilty to
one count of securities fraud involving 148 people
whom the prosecutor stated were defrauded of
$1,600,000, trial court properly ordered restitution
of 550,000. West's RCWA 9A.20.030, 21.20.010,
21.20.400.
•890 **781 John H. Browne, Browne, Ressler &
Foster, Seattle, for appellant and petitioner,
Fred J. Caruso, Deputy Prosecuting Atty.,
Spokane, for respondent.
MUNSON, Chief Judge.
By direct appeal and personal restraint petition,
Phillip Michael Stephan challenges his sentence for
violating the Securities Act of Washington under
RCW 21.20.010. [FN1] He contends RCW
21.20.400 [FN2j does not authorize either
imprisonment or restitution in his case. We affirm
the sentence and deny the personal restraint petition.
FN1. RCW 21.20.010 provides: "It is unlawful for
any person, in connection with the offer, sale or
purchase of any security, directly or indirectly: "(1)
To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud; "(2) To make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they are
made, not misleading; or "(3) To engage in any
act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person."
FN2. RCW 21.20.400 provides: "Any person who
wilfully violates any provision of this chapter except
RCW 21.20.350, or who wilfully violates any rule
or order under this chapter, or who wilfully violates
RCW 21.20.350 knowing the statement made to be
false or misleading in any material respect, shall
upon conviction be fined not more than five
thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both; but no person may be imprisoned
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for the violation of am rule or order if that person
proves that he or she had no knowledge of the rule
or order. No indictment or information may be
renirned under this chapter more than five years
after the alleged violation."
Mr. Stephan and two codefendants were charged
with 24 counts relating to fraudulent sale of
securities and theft. When the court denied Mr.
Stephan's motion to sever his trial from his
codefendants, Mr. Stephan pleaded guilty to *891
one count of fraud in connection with the offer and
sale of the security, a violation of RCW 21.20.010.
The amended information indicated Mr. Stephan
offered a fraudulent security to 148 people. **782
In his written plea statement, CrR 4.2(g), Mr.
Stephan indicated he understood the maximum
penalty for the violation was not more than 10 years
in prison and/or a $5,000 fine. The statement also
indicated Mr. Stephan understood the prosecutor
was going to recommend "the penal institution and
restitution." The statement indicated he understood
the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles set the
minimum prison term. On the final page of the
statement, Mr, Stephan indicated he did not know
the securities laws until he was charged with
violating them.
In the subsequent hearing on the plea, the court
orally advised Mr. Stephan the nature of the charge
and that he could receive a maximum penalty of 10
years in prison. Mr. Stephan indicated he
understood. The court orally advised him the
prosecutor was recommending incarceration; Mr,
Stephan indicated he understood this to be his
agreement with the prosecutor in exchange for
dropping the 23 remaining charges. When Mr.
Stephan attempted to present his limited involvement
in the activities, the court asked if he was qualifying
his statement. Mr. Stephan admitted again his
involvement and asserted he was guilty as charged;
neither he nor his attorney contended the court could
not incarcerate him or order restitution.
The sentencing hearing was held on July 14,
1982. At the hearing, Mr. Stephan outlmed his
limited involvement. His attorney sought leniency
and, for the first time, challenged the court's
authority under RCW 21.20.400 to incarcerate Mr.
Stephan. His attorney argued the statute would not
permit incarceration here because Mr. Stephan did
not know he violated a "rule or order". Counsel
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essentially argued "provision" and "rule or order"
mean the same thing. The court rejected this
analysis as it had several days previously when a
codefendant raised the same issue. Mr. Stephan was
aware of this decision. He was sentenced to *892
the maximum term of 10 years and to pay $50,000
in restitution over the 10-year period. During the
hearing, Mr. Stephan did not challenge that court's
authority to impose restitution.
This appeal (No. 5299-HI-l) and personal
restraint petition (No. 5719-III-4) followed. The
appeal challenges both the authority to incarcerate
Mr. Stephan and the authority to impose restitution.
The personal restraint petition argues: Mr. Stephan
did not knowingly enter his plea because he did not
know incarceration could occur and his trial counsel
was ineffective for misleading him on the issue.
Mr. Stephan's reading of RCW 21.20.400 is
incorrect. The term "rule or order" is consistently
used throughout RCW Title 21 to refer to actions of
the Director of Licensing of this state. See, e.g.,
RCW 21.20.110(2), .250, . 280, .310(1), .320(1),
.325, .370, and .390. RCW 21.20.390 begins:
Whenever it appears to the director that any
person has engaged or is about to engage in any
act or practice constituting a violation of any
provision of this chapter or any rule or order
hereunder, the director may in his or her
discretion:
(1) Issue an order ...
This is but one example showing the meaning of the
word "order". While the word "rule" also appears
throughout RCW Title 21 in reference to the
authority of the director, his or her authority to
make rules is established in RCW' 21.20.450:
The administration of the provisions of this
chapter shall be under the department of licensing.
The director may from time to time make, amend,
and rescind such rules and forms as are necessary
to carry out the provisions of this chapter,
including rules defining any term, whether or not
such term is used in the Washington securities
law. The director may classify securities,
persons, and matters within the director's
jurisdiction, and prescribe different requirements
for different classes. No rule or form, may be
made unless the director finds that the action is
necessary or appropriate in the public interest
•893 or for the protection of investors and
consistent with the purposes fairly intended by the
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policy and provisions of this chapter. In
prescribing rules and forms the director may
**783 cooperate with the securities administrators
of the other states and the securities and exchange
commission with a view to effectuating the policy
of this statute to achieve maximum uniformity in
the form and content of registration statements,
applications, and reports wherever practicable.
All rules and forms of the director shall be
published.
'[Rjule or order" thus clearly is meant to mean
something entirely different from "provision", used
in context with the phrase "of this chapter".
[1] The language of RCW 21.20.400 parallels the
language of section 32(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff. The scienter
requirement has been interpreted as a congressional
limitation on the rule-making authority of the
Securities and Exchange Commission. See Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 97 S.Ct. 1292,
51 L.Ed.2d 480 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 47
L.Ed.2d 668 (1976). See also A, Bromberg & L.
Lowenfels, Securities Fraud & Commodities Fraud
§ 2.1(240) (1982). The exception therefore has no
significance because Mr. Stephan pleaded guilty to a
violation of RCW 21.20.010, a statutory
"provision," not a "rule or order". The court did
not therefore err in sentencing Mr. Stephan to serve
10 years in prison.
|2][3][4][5J As to whether Mr. Stephan knowingly
entered the plea bargain, State v. Perez, 33
Wash.App. 258, 261-62, 654 P.2d 708 (1982),
applies:
When a defendant fills out a written statement on
plea of guilty in compliance with CrR 4.2(g) and
acknowledges that he or she has read it and
understands it and that its contents are true, the
written statement provides prima facie verification
of the plea's voluntariness. In re Keene, 95
Wash.2d 203, 206-07, 622 P.2d 360 (1980); In
re Teems, [28 Wash.App. 631, 626 P.2d 13
(1981) ]; State v. Ridgley, 28 Wash.App. 351,
623 P.2d 717 (1981). When the judge goes on to
inquire orally of the defendant and satisfies *894
himself on the record of the existence of the
various criteria of voluntariness, the presumption
of voluntariness is well nigh irrefutable.
Whether a plea is entered knowingly is decided by
looking at all the circumstances. Wood v. Morris,
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87 Wash.2d 501, 506, 554 P.2d 1032 (1976). See
also, State v. Chervenell, 99 Wash,2d 309, 314,
662 P.2d 836 (1983). Neither Wood nor In re
Keene, 95 Wash.2d 203, 622 P.2d 360 (1980),
require a reversal where the court fails explicitly to
ascertain the defendant's knowledge of the
consequences; instead, the record is searched for
factors which indicate such knowledge. Between the
written plea statement and the court's oral
affirmation of the plea, this record contains at least
six references to incarceration. We hold Mr.
Stephan entered his plea with full knowledge
incarceration was possible, notwithstanding his
attorney's misinterpretation of the statute.
[6] The next issue is whether the record supports
Mr. Stephan's assertion of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Review is again upon the entire record; the
issue is whether Mr. Stephan received effective
representation and a fair and impartial hearing.
State v. Ermert, 94 Wash.2d 839, 849, 621 P.2d
121 (1980).
[7][8] This record supports three conclusions: (1)
Mr. Stephan signed an agreement which the State
contends he and his counsel prepared. The
statement contained the appropriate maximum
penalty and the prosecutor's recommendation.
Further, a codefendant charged with the same
violation was sentenced to prison a few days earlier.
Mr. Stephan and his attorney were thus aware of the
possible consequences of his plea, (2) The attorney
argued in good faith that incarceration was not
proper. An appeal has been pursued by new counsel
raising the same issue. Therefore, it is difficult to
say the attorney's alleged advice was "a serious
dereliction of duty". State v. Butler, 17 Wash.App.
666, 678, 564 P.2d 828 (1977). Nor was it
"outside the range of competence required of
attorneys representing criminal defendants." State
v. Perez, supra at 264, 654 P.2d 708. (3) Mr.
Stephan *895 was specifically informed by the
**784 court the maximum penalty was 10 years
imprisonment; "a defendant has some duty to
request a clarification" in such a situation. State v.
Butler, supra at 674, 564 P.2d 828. We hold Mr.
Stephan received effective assistance of counsel.
Although counsel argued an erroneous reading of
RCW 21.20.400, Mr. Stephan was made aware the
possible consequences of his crime could include
incarceration. When the trial court indicates clearly
the penalty for a crime, any claim of ineffective
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assistance related to the penalty is waived. See In re
Teems, supra at 637, 626 P.2d 13.
Mr. Stephan next argues an order of restitution is
not permitted under RCW 21.20.400 because the
statute speaks only of imprisonment for 10 years
and'or a fine of $5,000. He further argues reference
to RCW 9A.20.020 [FN3] and RCW 9A.20.030
[FN4] is not correct because the Securities Act of
•896 Washington is not mentioned in RCW Title
9A.
FN3. Laws of 1981, ch. 137, § 37, p. 534 (the
former RCW 9A.20.020) stated in pertinent pan:
"(1) Felony, No person convicted of a classified
felony shall be punished by confinement or fine
exceeding the following: "... "(b) For a class B
felony, by confinement in a state correctional
institution for a term of ten years, or b\ a fine in an
amount fixed by the court of twenty thousand
dollars, or by both such confinement and fine; ..."
RCW 9A.20.020 now states in pertinent pan' "(1)
Felon>. Every person convicted of a classified
felony shall be punished as follows: "... "(b) For a
class B felonv. by imprisonment in a state
correctional institution for a maximum term of not
more than ten years, or by a fine in an amount
fixed by the coun of not more man twenty thousand
dollars, or b\ both such imprisonment and fine;
..." (Effective April 1. 1982.)
FN4. Laws of 1979, ch. 29, § 3, p. 174 (the former
RCW 9A.20.030) stated in peninent part: "(1) If a
person has gained money or property or caused a
victim to lose money or property through the
commission of a crime, upon conviction thereof the
coun, in lieu of imposing die fine authorized for the
offense under RCW 9A.20.020. may order the
defendant to pay an amount, fixed by the court, not
to exceed double the amount of the defendant's gain
or victim's loss from the commission of a crime."
RCW 9A.20.030 now states in pertinent pan: "(1) If
a person has gained money or property or caused a
victim to lose money or property through the
commission of a crime, upon conviction thereof or
when the offender pleads guilty to a lesser offense
or fewer offenses and agrees with the prosecutor's
recommendation that die offender be required to
pay restitution to a victim of an offense or offenses
which are not prosecuted pursuant to a plea
agreement, the court, in lieu of imposing the fine
authorized for the offense under RCW 9A.20.020,
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may order the defendant to pa\ an amount, fixed bv
the coun, not to exceed double the amount of the
defendant's gain or victim's loss from die
commission of a crime." (Effective July 10, 1982).
The State contends violation of RCW 21.20.400
becomes a class B felony because of the following
language of RCW 9A.20.040:
Prosecutions related to felonies defined outside
Title 9A RCW. In any prosecution under this title
where the grade or degree of a crime is
determined by reference to the degree of a felony
for which the defendant or another previously had
been sought, arrested, charged, convicted, or
sentenced, if such felony is defined by a statute of
this state which is not in Title 9A RCW, unless
otherwise provided:
(2) If the maximum sentence of imprisonment
authorized by law upon conviction of such felony
is eight years or more, but less than twenty years,
such felony shall be treated as a class B felony for
purposes of this title;
[9] First, Mr. Stephan did no! raise this argument
prior to this appeal, even though he was well aware
of the State's intention to seek restitution. Failure
to raise an issue before the trial coun generally
precludes the party from raising it on appeal. Smith
v. Shannon, 100 Wash.2d 26, 37, 666 P.2d 351
(1983). [FN5] Because of the precedential value
involved, we address the issue. See Sorenson v.
Bellingham, 80 Wash.2d 547, 558, 496 P.2d 512
(1972).
FN5. One problem created when an issue is not
presented at the trial level is readily apparent here.
Mr. Stephan has not addressed the effect of RCW
9A.20.040 on RCW 21.20.400 in his appeal. This
court is therefore without guidance on his view of
the statute.
•*785 [10][11] RCW 9A.20.040 is not a model of
clarity. Reference to "any prosecution under this
title" in the early part of the statute creates the
confusing idea that the prosecution must *897 be for
a classified crime already a part of RCW Title 9A.
The rules of statutory construction require that we
ascertain legislative intent, Millers Casualty Ins. Co.
v. Briggs, 100 Wash.2d 1, 5, 665 P.2d 891 (1983),
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seek the spirit of the provision. State v. The (1972)
Dan J. Evans Campaign Comm., 86 Wash.2d 503,
508, 546 P.2d 75 (1976), and avoid a construction
which voids any section or words, Nisqually Delta
Ass'n v. DuPont, 95 Wash.2d 563, 568, 627 P.2d
956 (1981). Applying these rules, we hold the
language quoted above refers to RCW 9A.04
through 9A.16, which defines terms, limits actions,
establishes culpability and capacity, sets the standard
of proof, establishes defenses, etc. RCW Title 9A
is the comprehensive criminal code of Washington;
all prosecutions are "under this title".
[12][13] The State's interpretation of RCW
9A.20.040 is correct. A felony defined outside
RCW Title 9A becomes a classified crime through
application of RCW 9A.20.040 and .020. A trial
court may order restitution unless prohibited by the
statute, RCW 9A.20.030.
[14] Mr. Stephan pleaded guilty to one count of
securities fraud involving 148 people. The
prosecutor stated these people were defrauded of
$1,600,000 to fund, in some manner, the
corporation's nonexistent leasing scheme.
Restitution of $50,000 is therefore well within the
evidence.
The conviction is affirmed and the personal
restraint petition is denied.
EDGERTON, J. pro tern., and McINTURFF, J.,
concur.
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